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Madra: Antinomies of Globalization

Antinomies of Globalization
Introduction: Refusing the forced choice
Today, we are told that globalism, or more precisely neoliberal
internationalism, is in crisis. The most important symptom of this crisis is the
rise of populist forms of nationalism (see, e.g., the MGDR review piece on
populism by Gökmen 2017). For any enlightened “secular” subject, the
choice between these two options must be clear: Given the racism,
ethnicism, chauvinism, sexism or climate denialism of many of the
nationalist populist options (think about Trump in US, Farage in UK, Le Pen
in France, and so on), even though the economics of neoliberal
internationalism has been detrimental in terms of economic injustice and
ecological disaster, we should bite the bullet and vote for the “centrist”
neoliberal option (Clinton, Remain, Macron, etc.). Nevertheless, one must
refuse this forced choice (which has the structure of “your life or your
money”) and recast the terms of the debate in a manner that opens up the
field to other paths to be explored and taken.1 The aim of this brief note is
to interrogate and deconstruct some seemingly intractable and hardened
antinomies of our times, explore how they may be implicated in and
constituted by each other’s presence, and trace the underlying semantic
matrix that governs the relations among the terms in a complexly and
unstable network.2 Once these hardened antinomies are pulverized into
overdetermined contradictions, it will be possible to offer a re-configuration
of the organizing problematic that structures and imposes limits to the public
debate on how to govern social reproduction.

In an op-ed prior to the election, Slavoj Zizek (2017) calls this a “false choice” whereas I
prefer to read it as a “forced choice” as not choosing the neoliberal internationalist option
implies a certain symbolic death in the eyes of the globalist “common sense”.
2 Marxian theorist Fredric Jameson (1994) defines antinomy by distinguishing it from
contradiction. While the two opposing propositions that make up an antinomy are “radically,
or absolutely, incompatible,” the contradiction “is a matter of partialities and aspects; only
some of it is incompatible with the accompanying proposition” (2). While antinomies are
frozen and resist dialecticization, contradictions are productive; they lend themselves to
mediation, movement, and transformation. Jameson, rather than choosing between the
two, proposes a layered model where antinomies are symptoms of underlying
contradictions. Let me also note that Jameson, in distinguishing antinomy from
contradiction suppresses another, and according Louis Althusser (1965), properly Marxist
concept of overdetermination. This third concept of causality indicates that every
conjuncture, site or process is a concatenated and unstable unity of contradictions. In this
short note, antinomies will be contaminated and pulled apart towards tracing their
overdetermination; in this manner, their ambivalences will be teased out.
1
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The defining antinomy of our post-2008 crash phase, as the forced
choice described above suggests, is argued to be the one between
neoliberalism and populism. But again as the forced choice above
demonstrates, this antinomy is easily grafted onto another, older antinomy
between internationalism and nationalism. Older, because implicitly
underlying this second antinomy is one between free trade and
protectionism — the history of which can be traced to the early periods of
capitalism. During the first half of the nineteenth century, in a controversy
known as the Corn Law debates, a late-mercantilist configuration of nationstate-capital triad in England insisted on the protection of capitalist
agriculture, whereas the emergent industrial bourgeoisie demanded free
trade. In this foundational debate of classical political economy, Reverend
Thomas Malthus, taking a nationalist position, pushed for the protection of
domestic farmers and landed aristocracy. In contrast, David Ricardo, based
on his own theory of comparative advantage, argued that free trade would
be beneficial not only for Britain but also for every other trading nation. This
deep running division, in turn, summons another antinomy between
globalization and imperialism. This last antinomy is invoked not only
because the nationalist-populist pole tends to mobilize anti-imperialist
rhetoric and arguments against what neoliberal internationalists champion
as the inevitable historical march of globalization, but also because the latter
camp deploys it in order to assert the superior economic efficiency of freetrade over the inefficiencies of inter-imperialist rivalries (protectionism,
conflicts, wars, etc.) and therefore the historical necessity and inevitability
of world peace under a world market. Table 1, following the Jameson
suggestion, layers the three primary antimonies discussed so far.
Table 1: A Layering of Antimonies
Neoliberalism

Populism

Internationalism

Nationalism

Globalization

(Anti-)Imperialism

In order to refuse the forced choice imposed on us by such alignment
of these antinomies, the card-deck must be re-shuffled so that a more
complex and distributed mapping of the relation among these terms can be
discerned. Needless to say, as the terms of the antinomies are interrogated
and reorganized in new combinations, antinomies will proliferate
polysemically: imperialism vs. internationalism, liberalism vs. socialism,
democracy vs. authoritarianism, laissez faire vs. planning, market vs. state,
global vs. local, early vs. late globalization (see, e.g., Turcan 2016), (late)
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capitalism vs. post-capitalism, and finally, populism vs. counter-populism.
And in fact, it would be possible to begin our investigation from any one of
these antinomies – as each and every one of them and others that one can
conjure up are equally relevant and meaningful points of departure.
However, because the three antinomies that line-up as the two poles of the
forced choice is the one that our historical conjuncture serves us, we will
take them as our entry point and explore the other antinomies as the
relations among the terms of the three antinomies are interrogated and
reconfigured.

Internationalism: Neoliberal or anti-imperialist?
Let us begin with the alignment of internationalism with neoliberalism.
Without doubt, the so-called marketization (privatization of publicly-owned
enterprises, rolling back of welfare transfers) and (trade and financial)
liberalization policies that are associated with neoliberalism have indeed
contributed to the internationalization of the world economy — both by
reconfiguring the role of the nation-state and by increasing the flow of
commodities and values across countries. In this sense, there is indeed an
internationalist strain to neoliberalism. Or, to put it differently, neoliberal
reason has historically pushed for the increased freedom of movement of
capital and commodities (but not necessarily humans).
But this lining up of internationalism and neoliberalism must be
problematized. First, internationalism, as announced forcefully with the
rallying cry, “Workers of the World, Unite!” in Marx and Engels’ Communist
Manifesto (1848) and institutionalized in the First (1864-1876) and the
Second Internationals (1889-1916), has also been historically an anticapitalist and anti-imperialist ideology. In this regard, Marx’s own take on
the Corn Law debates is worth recalling: Assessing the potential
consequences of both protectionism and free-trade on the conditions of
working people, Marx (1962[1848]) argued that, despite the fact that a freetrade policy does not necessarily improve their lot, working people should
side with the free-trade internationalist as the internationalization of capital
would eliminate the feudal remnants and clarify the battle lines between the
capitalist classes and the working people. In this version of internationalism,
Marx appears to be endorsing Ricardo’s view of capitalism as a
revolutionizing force but for diametrically opposite reasons.
Nevertheless, the relation between internationalism and nationalism,
precisely because of the persistence of imperialism, has been a very difficult
question for the socialists and communists as they have historically been
caught in between the 1914-1945 debacle of two World Wars interspersed
with the Great Depression, on the one hand, and the wave of anti-colonialist
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nationalist liberation revolutions across the world in the second half of the
twentieth century on the other (Chatterjee 2012; Nairn 1997). In 1914, the
anti-imperialist internationalism of Second International fell into a tragic
crisis when the social democrats and socialists of the Great Powers voted
for the war decision in their respective parliaments. This experience,
combined with the October Revolution in Russia and Lenin’s formulation of
The Right of the Nations for Self-determination, have led the left to split
nationalism into two. Nationalism as the ideology of imperialist Great
Powers was rejected as a chauvinism that obscured the fact that imperialist
wars and colonial interventions, waged in the name of securing the
conditions of existence of the accumulation of surplus value, were against
the class interests of the working people (Lenin 1973[1917]). In contrast,
anti-colonialist nationalism was endorsed as the self-defense of the
colonized people against an Empire that was always compelled to
incorporate newer non-capitalist (colonial) territories into its domain not only
to exploit their resources but also to use them as fresh markets for selling
both consumer and capital goods (Luxemburg 1972[1921]). Interestingly, of
course, some of the erstwhile colonies – now free to pursue their national
interests – are now offering strong international competition to the workers
of the advanced capitalist nations, again forcing workers on each side to
choose between the devil and the deep blue sea.

Nationalism: Good and Bad
Therefore, both internationalism and nationalism are split categories. There
are neoliberal as well as progressive internationalisms. Similarly, there are
imperialist as well as anti-colonialist nationalisms. Nevertheless, even this
division is far from stable. On the one hand, throughout its century long
history, many Marxists have been very critical about Soviet Union’s
instrumentalization of “internationalism” in the name of its own “socialimperialist” designs (e.g., Eastern Europe, Afghanistan). On the other hand,
if we were to recall the Bandung conference and its principles, Third World
nationalism turned out to be a much more authentically inter-nationalist
program than the Cold-War neo-imperialism of Pax-Americana. In 1955, the
Bandung Conference brought together many of the then newly-independent
Asian and African states and as its central tenet foregrounded peaceful
coexistence among equal sovereign nation-states. In the words of President
Sukarno (of Indonesia), the host of the conference, the aim was to inject
“the voice of reason into world affairs” (cf. Chatterjee 2012, p. 11). In
contrast, Pax-Americana persistently meant wars, conflicts, and
interventions (e.g., Korean War, Cuba, Vietnam War, Chile, Iran).
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Within this anti-colonialist Bandung rubric, we can also identify the
progressive economic character of postwar developmental nationalism.
Squarely situated within the Keynesian macroeconomic paradigm that
takes the nation-state as the unit of its analysis, versions of post-war
developmental governmentality conceptualized development as a means of
emancipation from — depending on the particular third world context —
backwardness,
stagnation,
underdevelopment,
dependency,
neocolonialism or unequal exchange; and conceived of economic
development as a national project.3 “Nationalism,” writes Tom Nairn, “was
the effort by one ‘backward’ culture and people after another to appropriate
the powers and benefits of modernity for their own use” (1993, p. 71).
Of course, the distinctive feature of our modernity has been the
process of capitalist accumulation and its internationalizing tendencies.
Nationalism figures in, among its other ideological functions, as a social
frame to harness and appropriate the powers and benefits of capitalist
growth. Yet, this figuration of nationalism – where modernity is represented
as a neutral tool and the nation-form refers to a unified people – covers up
over two constitutive and interconnected economic cleavages. These are
the proper “exploitation” cleavage within the nation and the “unequal
exchange” cleavage among the nations. The former cleavage designates a
set of “class differences” among those who produce, appropriate, distribute
or receive surplus value within a nation. The latter cleavage, on the other
hand, designates a hierarchy of nations ranging from those that reap the
benefits of the movement of capital (core, center, metropolis) to those that
need to defend and pull themselves from being the victims or objects of
capital (periphery, satellite; see Dholakia 2018 for a discussion invoking the
powerfully simple center-periphery model of Galtung 1980). Without doubt,
these two cleavages intersect with each other, forming a matrix of
interconnected problems and antagonisms (Dholakia 2018). For instance,
all nations, whether they be core, semi-periphery, or periphery, are multiply
cleaved by class differences and exposed to the destabilizing effects of
class antagonism.
It is thus necessary to invent institutions and discourses that allow
class conflict to be subordinated to a relatively effective, durable, and
“equitable” “general interest.” This allows us to understand in
particular why projects of national construction, consequently
3

That is, until the neoliberal revolution of 1980s when they are replaced by the highly
myopic balance of payments national accounting framework on the macro side and the
symptom-level interventionism of “poor economics” on the micro side. For a recent survey
of this trajectory, see Akbulut, Adaman and Madra 2015.
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nationalist ideologies in the modern age, have such difficulty
presenting themselves as something other than either imperialist or
anti-imperialist programs, a way to establish or tear down hegemony.
If there is no monopoly to defend or conquer, there can be no state;
and if there is no state, there can be no nation (Balibar 2004, pp. 189).
Nevertheless, the nationalist vernacular that is supposed to
domesticate and manage the class antagonism will always be deployed in
a differential manner, depending on a given nation’s relative position within
the hierarchy of nations. And it is precisely depending how the nationalist
vernacular is deployed and depending on the given social composition and
direction of the popular class alliance that is being forged, a nationalism can
either be aggressive, chauvinist, imperialist and colonialist; or, conversely,
self-defensive, progressive, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist. Notice that
while trying to deconstruct one antinomy (internationalism vs. nationalism),
we found ourselves entangled in another one (imperialist vs. anti-imperialist
nationalism). Trying to break the alignment between neoliberalism and
internationalism, we unpacked the problem of internationalism by theorizing
the hierarchies among and within nation-states, without sufficiently
problematizing the historical articulation of neoliberalism with the
institutional form of nation-state. Let us now turn our attention to this
question.

Neoliberal State and Nation
The alignment between neoliberalism and internationalism can be
destabilized from the perspective of neoliberalism as well: Neoliberalism is
neither inherently anti-statist nor internationalist. Historically (and for some
of its strains, theoretically) neoliberalism, contrary to what its numerous
advocates and detractors alike tend to argue, did not entail the rolling back
of the state — rather it entailed an epochal reconfiguration of its relation to
its subjects (for a recent view from the periphery, see Gago 2017). In
contrast to the post-WWII welfare states of advanced capitalist social
formations and the developmental state of the Third World, the neoliberal
state does not treat its subjects as citizens but rather as consumers or
entrepreneurs (Foucault 2008). In other words, even though “small state”
has been a rallying cry of the neoliberal revolution, the historical record
shows that the nation-states, far from shrinking, have become more
involved in regulating and governing the social field—albeit through
mechanisms of control. In fact, this is precisely what distinguishes
neoliberalism from classical liberalism: While the latter, at least ideologically
speaking, aimed at protecting the autonomy of civil society and the markets
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from the interventions of a mercantilist state, the neoliberal counterrevolution aimed at transforming the welfare state by submitting its functions
to an audit of economic efficiency and performance (see also, Özgün,
Dholakia and Atik 2017). Without doubt, there is a world of difference
between the mercantilist state and the welfare state. While the former was
a capitalist nation-state still in-formation, the latter is a state that has been
forged out of a century-long class struggle and the two world wars. The
welfare state has already and irreversibly extended its reach beyond market
maintenance (protection of private property, antitrust regulation) all the way
into the depths of social reproduction: education, health care,
unemployment insurance, childcare, social security, and so on. In that
regard, a quick look at the topics discussed in Milton Friedman’s Capitalism
and Freedom (fiscal policy, education, discrimination, occupational
licensure, income distribution, social welfare, and poverty) will demonstrate
that the aim of neoliberal counter-revolution is to reconfigure all these
functions of the modern welfare state (governmentality) around the
assumption that human beings respond to economic incentives.4
All of which explains the persistence of the state under neoliberalism,
but not the persistence of the nation. Yet, perhaps except for European
Union — and even in this case, as the recent case of Brexit demonstrated,
by fits and starts — the nation-form and nationalism have not only survived
the decades of neoliberal internationalism but re-emerged in the form of the
nation qua brand (Aronczyk 2013, Kaneva 2011). Neoliberal thought
conceptualizes the international sphere as a competitive realm within which
each nation-state competes with one another. The nationhood is turned into
a corporate brand that functions as a platform for the ecology of national
industries and sectors, promoted through public-private partnership
schemes. Turkey presents a relevant example in this context even though
it is far from being the most successful one. Since the early 1990s, Turkey,
like many other nation-states, has been trying to cultivate a discourse of
nationality as a global brand by positioning, in particular, Istanbul as a
cultural, financial and transportation hub (Keyder 1999). One could arguably
claim that this is a “good” kind of nationalism, one that is competing in a
world market, rather than waging wars. Yet, there is, of course, a dark side
4

The specific focus of this paper prevents me from differentiating among forms of
neoliberal reason with respect to their respective positions on the uses and limitations of
markets. For instance, there is a world of difference between Milton Friedman’s vision of
capitalism and freedom and Joseph Stiglitz’s vision of market socialism, even if both visions
are premised upon the working assumption that human beings comprehend and respond
predictably to economic incentives. For a discussion of forms of neoliberal reason, see
(Madra and Adaman 2014).
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to this kind of corporate nationalism as well. Consider, for instance, the
urban displacement and gentrification caused by the production of Istanbul
as the European Cultural Capital in 2010. Or, consider the disastrous
ecological impact of the third airport (and its associated third bridge across
the Bosporus as well as the connecting thruways) that is being built on the
northern forests of Istanbul in order to position Turkish Airlines as the
locomotive of brand Turkey (Paker 2017). This should not come as a
surprise given that the idea of “national interests,” especially in neoliberal
times, does not only suppress the interests of the local, the dispossessed
and the disempowered but is also a decisively anthropocentric notion that
defines itself against the backdrop of an utterly exploitable Earth.
The persistence of the nation-state as an economic actor – despite
the decades of neoliberal counter-revolution – can also be explained by its
increasing role in managing the articulation of the national capital with the
international economic order. Throughout the neoliberal decades, again
despite the strong anti-state rhetoric, what we observed was a growing
emphasis on the strategic capacities of nation-states to promote and
enhance national competitiveness in an increasingly internationalized world
economy. According to this Schumpeterian vision, the nation-state can
function as a central organizing agency that coordinates the allocation of
resources to promote technological, organizational and product innovation
in order to enhance the structural competitiveness of the nation — both by
providing a strong basis for the international competitiveness of national
capital and a favorable environment for foreign direct investment. An
important distinguishing aspect of this Schumpeterian “workfare” state has
been “the subordination of social policy to the demands of labor market
flexibility and structural competitiveness” (Jessop 1993, p. 9) — an
approach that is fully compatible with the neoliberal critique of the
Keynesian welfare state of the postwar era. In other words,
internationalization of the world economy does not entail the disappearance
of the nation-state but rather its neoliberal transformation.5

Globalization: Financing nationalism
Today, neoliberalism’s globalist, end-of-history vision of ‘one big world
market’ is indeed in crisis and the rise of populisms is indeed a symptom of
this crisis. But once more we must tread carefully. It is true that the 2008
crash and the subsequent economic depression did not only put a very
strong bracket around financialization and securitization, but also
demonstrated decisively that the nation-state remains to be an
indispensable actor in governing social reproduction at an international
5

For a recent take on this theme see (Mazzucato 2015).
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scale. Nevertheless, these assertions need to be qualified. First, the bracket
around the networks and derivatives of financial capital is yet to be fully
enacted. Despite riding the populist resentment against Wall Street before
being elected, the Trump Administration is looking forward to dismantle the
already timid Dodd-Frank Act (intended to rein in the excesses of finance
capital) and the speed of financialization and securitization have quickly
resumed its pre-crisis levels (for an immediate post-crisis view, see
Dholakia 2011). Yet, there is a widespread agreement that global financial
markets have become the key sources of risk for the world economy and
polity — even if this agreement has yet to find the right agency and the
program to implement its control. In this regard, it is possible to read leftwing populism of Bernie Sanders in the US and Jeremy Corbyn in the UK
as the emergence of a political agency and program with the explicit
objective of implementing such a control over finance capital —but more on
this below.
Second, the internationalized structure of financial markets impose
significant limits on the effectivity of the monetary policy interventions of the
central banks (the Fed, the ECB, etc.). For instance, the Fed, while
intending to inject liquidity to the US economy with “quantitative easing”,
ended up instead funneling funds towards the emerging financial markets,
financing economic growth in these mid-range nation-states (not only
BRICS; but also the so-called MINT, namely Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and
Turkey; see, e.g., Rodner 2017). And, it is precisely this global financial
expansion, even after the 2008 crisis, which provided the populist regimes
across the globe the funds for consolidating their sovereign hold. On the
one hand, these populist regimes used the capital inflow to finance domestic
credit expansion. Availability of cheap credit meant for these growing middle
classes easier access to new commodities and aspired to life-styles. On the
other, this easy money financed the construction sector (through
mortgages) as well as the mega infrastructural projects. These construction
investments did not only soak up some of the unemployment in the low-skill
end of the labor market but also served an ideological function for projecting
the grandiosity of the nation-state. The case in point is of course Erdoğan
and the resilience of his popular support despite his brand of increasingly
authoritarian populist nationalism. In an ironic twist, therefore, financial
internationalization became an indispensable condition of possibility of
populist nationalism.
In this very practical sense, the very framing of the problem as an
irreconcilable antinomy between neoliberal internationalism and populist
nationalism does not hold. Not only is the economic feasibility of populist
nationalism contingent upon the ceaseless flow of international capital,
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global financial investors are, in turn, hooked on these high-risk high-return
securities originating from emerging markets. This symbiotic relationship
between financial capital and authoritarian regimes problematizes another
doxa of globalism regarding the relation between capitalism and
democracy. In recent years, an institutionalist literature has argued that
successful long-run growth performance of an economy is directly
correlated with the existence of established, stable and strong institutions
of market economy, namely, competitive markets, secure property rights,
political competition, and a general sense of rule of law. Nevertheless, the
increasing internationalization and securitization endows financial capital
with an unprecedented elasticity and liquidity to adapt itself to the political
risks associated with authoritarian regimes. At the end of the day, as long
as there are no restrictions over the movement of financial assets, as long
as the authoritarian practices of sovereign nation-states do not disrupt the
financial flows, and as long as the risk premium is properly incorporated into
the interest rate, there is no reason for international finance not to cooperate
with authoritarian regimes.
Yet for all the nations that are plugged into the global financial
network, the access to finance does not come without a cost. Increased
securitization and liquidity means increased risk of herd behavior,
speculative bubble formation (see, e.g., Dholakia and Turcan 2013), and
sudden and high volume movements of short-term capital. One way to
make sense of the recent resurgence of populist reactions against global
finance and peoples’ desire to use the nation-state to protect their
(imagined) communities is an increasing realization of the vulnerability of
societies against the violence of finance and capital accumulation (Marazzi
2011).

Reactionary nationalism
As already discussed above, the way the nationalist vernacular is deployed
and articulated and the social composition of the national populist front
(which groups are included and which are excluded) will shape the form that
the self-protection of a society will take. It is perhaps the moment to invoke
Karl Polanyi’s celebrated notion of “double movement” — but only with the
proviso that Polanyi himself makes with respect to “fascism” as one of the
many possible responses to the crises and excess of the “market system”
(2001 [1944], p. 255). Organized societies, to the extent that they can
transcend the short-term perspective imposed upon them by economic
rationality, may develop institutions and mechanisms to contest and limit
the acephalic movement of the circuits of capital. And, the nation-form has
historically been quite an effective form in accomplishing this task — until it
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stopped being so with the neoliberal turn. Today, the desire to return to an
era before globalization, before neoliberalism, can perhaps be understood
in this vein. But, the question that needs to be posed, precisely at this
juncture, is the one Polanyi asked during the Second World War: What will
be the content of the nation-form that this new populist resurgence deploys
in order to protect its imagined community? If, as Partha Chatterjee argues,
Empire, and its “prerogative to declare the colonial exception”, “is certainly
not dead” (2012, p. 15, 23), then this question cannot be answered without
considering the imperial hierarchy of nations. This question is even more
urgent today given all that is evoked by Trump’s election slogan: MAKE
AMERICA GREAT AGAIN. Writing in 2012, Chatterjee was prescient:
The asymmetry between the economic troubles of the Western
powers and their overwhelming military superiority could well open
the field for populist resurgence of imperialism, not unlike what was
seen in the late nineteenth century. The economic decline of the
once privileged is fertile ground for the ugly display of naked power.
There are signs already of a growing populist politics in the United
States and Western Europe seeking to defend the global privileges
of the core body of citizens of these countries against the assertions
of lesser powers and the intrusions of alien immigrants (2012, p. 21).
Reading populist resurgence solely from the grid of the forced choice
outlined above makes it impossible to see the diversity of forms of
populisms. Every populism, to the extent that they must draw a friendenemy line, must take up a position on one side or another of the
imperialism/anti-imperialism divide (Gökmen 2017). One must tread very
carefully here, however, as imperialism is not a Manichaean order; there is
a hierarchy of nations and what appears to be an anti-imperialist nationalism
from one perspective might as well be fueled by the promises of pecuniary
as well as symbolic spoils of regional imperialist projections. Once again,
Erdoğan’s recently found anti-imperialist rhetoric is premised upon the
defeat of his administration’s very own regional imperialist projections
regarding the Middle East as well as the increasingly intractable Kurdish
question as an “international colony” (Beşikçi 2015).

In lieu of conclusion: Is a trans-local counter-populism
possible?
It is in this precise sense, following Balibar’s (2017) formulation, we can
distinguish between populism and counter-populism. Balibar argues that
nationalist and imperialist forms of populism across the world appropriate
and instrumentalize “deep divisions within our societies that neoliberalism
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has either intensified or generated […] under the terminology of ‘anger’” and
channel “resentment feelings of insecurity […] aggressively toward
scapegoats and ‘internal enemies’”. In order to confront these forms of
populism, Balibar calls for imagining a “transnational counter-populism” that
does not concede the criticism of “the dispossession or disempowerment of
the masses in the oligarchic regime” to the imperialist versions of
nationalist-populism; and that, instead “seeks and requires the
empowerment of the citizenry, therefore pushing its capacity beyond the
limits and across the borders that in the past defined the political”.
It is important to note that Balibar is not calling for a progressive
populist-nationalism but rather a “transnational counter-populism” — the
key category being transnational. This new category introduces a further
complication to our aforementioned antinomies of globalization. Given that
his own writing and politics have historically been preoccupied with the
internal as well as external borders of Europe, his choice of “transnational”
should not come as a surprise. Moreover, the cycle of revolutionary
upheavals – from Athens to Tahrir Square, from Plaza del Sol to Wall
Street, and from Wisconsin to Istanbul’s Gezi – did indeed announce itself
as a transnational phenomenon. Yet, as this cycle of revolutionary uprising
against neoliberalism, authoritarianism and their various combinations
dissipated, the transnational and trans-local nature of this “global crowd”
(Buck-Morss 2015) was lost and their oppositional energies were culled by
populist movements that took the nation-form as their container. This
recoiling back into the shell of the nation-form happened even when these
movements continued to acknowledge the necessity of maintaining a
transnational perspective: on the left, Syriza, Podemos, Bernie Sanders and
most recently, Corbyn’s Labour are all part of the same sequence, even if
each followed a different path and in some cases lost their nerve
somewhere along the road.
The necessity of maintaining a transnational perspective, while
operating within the political frame of the nation-form and enhancing the
capabilities of citizens at the local level at the same time is perhaps the most
important challenge of all these counter-populisms. Trans-nationality or, if
we do not want to override the regional and the local in the name of the
national, trans-locality is necessary because the problems that we face are
transnational and trans-local: The ecological crisis and the crisis of
capitalism are both global problems that cannot be tackled adequately only
at the national or the local level — even if all solutions must be built ground
up, at the level of micro-politics of subjectivity, by contesting the biopolitical
subjectivities of neoliberal forms of governmentality with equal measure.
The internal tensions of politics of degrowth illustrates this point perfectly
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(Kallis, Kerschner and Martinez-Alier 2012). On the one hand, “degrowth”
is a global, transnational proposition — it requires all the nations to act in a
coordinated manner even as its actual implementation also recognizes the
legacy of colonial history and the unevenness of development across
nations. On the other hand, degrowth is a local, ethico-political proposition
— it invites everyone to reflect upon the impact of their consumption
patterns on the ecology as well as to question the types of work-life relations
cultivated by the neoliberal forms of superego. In between these two poles
of the global and the local, a politics of degrowth cannot afford to ignore the
scale of national economy and the institutions and dispositifs of the nationstate as terrains of legitimate struggle — even if their very constitution has
historically been premised upon harnessing the powers and benefits of
modernity in the name of national interest.
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